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Abstract  
This paper explores the issue of hegemony under transnational capitalism. It conceptualizes how 
transnational accumulation and supraterritorial space has altered capitalism in general and its hegemony in 
particular. It aims to provide a framework of understanding and analyzing the way globalization has 
reshaped the terrain and parameters of social, economic and political relations both at the national and the 
global levels, and exerted pressure on the resilient and hegemonic capacities of capitalism. It proposes to 
examine the ways social relations of domination, subordination and organic interplay are produced, 
maintained, decomposed and delinked while continuously undergoing transformations. Inspired by the 
Gramscian and Polanyian theoretical and analytical categories, the paper analyses the fading “organic” 
linkage between state, market and civil society under transnational capitalism. In concludes that 
transnational capitalism is creating serious dual contradictions: the crisis of both hegemony and counter-
hegemony. Transnational capitalism is not able to create a “transnational hegemony” similar to that under 
nation-state capitalism, nor is it able to foster a transnational consensual power of civil society and organic 
counter-hegemony social forces. Rather, transnational capitalism is producing the opposite result: reducing 
the legitimacy of capitalism’s hegemony and limiting its resilient capacities while creating non-organic 
counter-hegemonic movements in various forms and directions including fundamentalism and terrorism. 
 
Keywords: globalization, capitalism, hegemony, passive revolution, double movement, resiliency, ultra-
imperialism 
 
Introduction 
Hegemony and counter-hegemony revisited 
The ability of capitalist class societies to adapt to change while retaining their essential features of 
organization and mode of functioning raises important issues for political and social sciences as well as for 
social movements. The concept of hegemony was sophisticatedly developed by Gramsci (1971), who used it 
to refer to a style of state politics that preserves control by a leading group on the one hand while instituting 
economic, social, political and ideological changes on the other. In other words, the concept encapsulates 
the means by which a dominant class is able to maintain a certain degree of consensual hegemony by 
neutralizing the pressures of various contending forces that might otherwise trigger profound structural 
transformations. Consequently, the defusing process is achieved without undergoing a political revolution 
that potentially could threaten the dominance of the leading group and the “modus operandi” of the system. 
It is in this context that the concept of hegemony should be understood as an expression of broadly based 
consent, manifested in the acceptance of ideas and supported by material resources and institutions. 
Ideologically hegemony implies social consent which is regarded as a component of the system of 
democratic institutions and liberal ideology whereby the general interests of the population were to a larger 
extent taken into consideration by the leading class. This give-and-take strategy was functional to the 
stability of the social structure. Simultaneously, non-state or semi-state institutions such as education, the 
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media and the church exerted a significant impact on people’s consciousness in influencing their ways of 
living thus contributing to the maintenance of the position and legitimacy of the capitalist ruling class.  
Politically, this pattern of social control, which was part of a truce in the ongoing “war of position” in 
the post-World War II arrangements, revealed the potency embedded in bourgeois political hegemony. Its 
skilful competence in winning the “rule of legitimation” through the manufacturing of “false consciousness” 
(Gramsci, 1971) resulted in the acceptance of the perception of the capitalist political and economic system 
and social structures as inherently rational and natural. In other words, the ruling elites have been able to 
depoliticize social conflicts or issues of contention with “a ‘prepolitical’ process that constructs the public 
agenda and thus predisposes ‘politics’ to a narrowed set of choices” (Ross & Trachte, 1990:9). Not to be 
ignored however is that this political evolution was preconditioned on an economy characterized by a 
certain degree of employment and social security.  
At the global level, Robinson summarizes some of the main interwoven conceptions of hegemony in 
the historical evolution of the world capitalist system: 1) Hegemony as international domination 
(domination in the Realistic tradition); 2) Hegemony as state hegemony (inter-state relations, the power of 
the core states); 3) Hegemony as consensual domination or ideological hegemony (soft power, rule by 
consent and cultural leadership); 4) Hegemony as the exercise of leadership within historical blocs within a 
particular world order (a hegemon-based historical project under a particular social structure of 
accumulation) (Robinson, 2005:1-2). These categories are not mutual exclusive but overlapping with each 
containing some elements of the other.  
While Gramsci ascribed the willingness of the bourgeoisie to accept socio-political and economic 
reforms to the modalities of its rule, Karl Polanyi looked at the disfunctioning of the interdependency 
between society and market as the reason for the unleashing of tensions latent in the relationship. The 
constant attempt by the capitalist class to escape from the control of the state and society encapsulated in the 
endeavor to shift the balance in the “war of position” in its favor by imposing a “self-regulating market” 
leads to a political reaction in order to protect society from this utopian project. Thus in the Polanyian 
interpretation of the history of industrial capitalism, two movements are discerned. The one is the liberation 
of the market forces from political and social control, i.e., the “disembedding” of the economy. The other 
being the second phase of the “double movement” with the reimposition of political supervision and control 
of the market in order to safeguard the interests of society (Polanyi [1944]1957). This “reembedding” of the 
economy is society’s spontaneous responses to protect itself against the advent of the logic of the markets. 
Thus, while not abandoning the structural level of analysis, the attempt is made in the thrust of these 
two approaches to surmount the dichotomy between structure and agency and emphasize the role of politics 
in the evolution of capitalism. The combination of both insights is useful to the analysis of the turmoil of the 
20th century with its alternance of revolution and counterrevolution, reform and contra-reform as well as war 
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and peace. Following the Great Depression, capitalism worldwide underwent a transformation based on the 
rejection of laissez-faire capitalism for a more regulated macro-economic system of controlled and 
rationalized production. This process can be identified as a “passive revolution” which found expression in 
the reorganization of capitalism in the 1930s and the postwar era through the adoption of the New Deal, 
Keynesianism and Fordism in the United States and Europe.  
While some countries reacted to the crises and potential revolutions in the first half of the 20th
century through socio-economic measures preserving parliamentary democracy, the political elites of 
catching-up countries such as Germany, Italy and Japan resorted to Nazism and Fascism characterized by 
ultra-nationalism, militarism and contra-imperialism. Nonetheless, the common denominator for the 
reaction of all industrialized countries to the worldwide crisis of capitalism can be grasped in Polanyi’s 
“double movement”, i.e., the attempt to shield societies from the ravages of the world market and pre-empt 
the consummation of the “war of movement” into revolutions and class wars through a retrenchment from 
the international economy by the implementation of protectionism and self-centered economic policies. 
As a continuation to the author’s previous researches on the evolution of capitalism (Li and Hersh, 
2002, 2004), the point of entry of this paper’s analysis is derived from reflections over a number of 
challenging questions arising from the evolution of the capitalist system into the stage of transnational 
capitalism:  
- How to conceptualize the notion of hegemony under transnational capitalism given its 
transformative differences from the nation-state and inter-state system? 
- Can the resiliency of capitalism transcend to retain its passive revolution capacities under the
conditions of transnational capitalism when the balancing mechanism of an organic transnational 
civil society is not yet in shape (an organic counter-hegemonic historical bloc)?  
- If conventional boundaries of nation-states are becoming vague, how will classes and groups be 
integrated into organic social forces? And how will a transnational “common sense” and “collective 
will” (Gramsci, 1971) be generated? 
- Where is the transnational “passive revolution” mechanism which is be able to play the traditional 
role of neutralizing the inherent contradictions between productive forces which are becoming 
tranasnationalized and production relations which are still more or less nationally based?  
- Can the “disembeddment” of transnational economy from societal constraints succeed in 
transforming the socio-economic pattern into a transnational market society, or will it release a new 
“second movement” (Polanyi, 1957)? 
- Will transnational capitalism eventually develop the capacity of trasformismo 1 (Gramsci, 1971) 
whereby reformism, civil societies and subordinate groups are incorporated into the dominant 
project of transnational capitalism so as to prevent the legitimation crisis and the rise of counter-
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hegemonic forces? 
 
Mothodology: IPE with a combined approach of Gramsci and Polanyi 
An issue of debate is whether Gramsci’s political theory with its basic notions and concepts rooted in a 
nation-state historicity can be applied to the analysis of international relations and international political 
economy in the contemporary era. An affirmative position stresses the criteria of whether Gramsci’s 
political ideas are able to discern “long-term organic tendencies” and differentiate them from “immediate, 
contingent and short-term” effect so as to determine “what indeed is historically original and novel in social 
reality and what is the reproduction of the ‘old’, in different forms, that is, to understand the intersections of 
elements of continuity and change” (Sassoon, 2001:6). Gramsci’s innovative conceptual framework of 
hegemony rejects the reduction of politics as a predetermined social topography; rather, it constructs politics 
as constitutive of the social itself. Thus, hegemony, from the Gramscian perspective, is more than economic 
dominance and is an art of politics that treats society not as a self-regulating totality but as a complex 
plurality of contradictions and antagonisms. 
The critical position on extending Gramsci’s conceptual relevance to the global level challenges the 
ontological and epistemological foundation of the neo-Gramscian school in bringing the historically specific 
notions and concepts of Gramsci’s political sociology into the IR and IPE realms. The main points of the 
critique are: 1) the socio-historical origin of Gramsci concepts and theories cannot be directly reflected in 
their contemporary usage, such as an “transnational state” and an “transnational civil society”; 2) Gramsci’s 
essential recognition of the material base of hegemony (the economic dimension) must be recognized even 
though his theory is often interpreted as being adeterministic and ahistorical structuralism underlining the 
role of ideas/ideologies (Germain and Kenny, 1998). In this connection, a similar point can also be leveled 
at the applicability of Polanyi’s “double movement” – that is the transposition of the dialectics of civil 
society’s organically organized counter-movement within the nation-state to the global level. 
The paper finds it heuristic value in the application of the extended Gramsci’s conceptual and 
analytical apparatus (hegemony, civil society and historical bloc) in combination with the analytical 
thoughts of Karl Polanyi concerning the dialectics of market-society relations to explicate our thesis on the 
crisis of hegemony and counter-hegemony under transnational capitalism:  
a) The disproportionate power of transnational capital expressed in its lopsided mobility decreases the 
“consent basis of hegemony” by having a negative impact on the system’s resilient capacities shown 
in connection with the post-Cold War geopolitical changes;  
b) The relative decline of the state’s intervention capability and policy-making sovereignty, together 
with the lack of organic civil societies as consent-generating mechanism in balancing and 
neutralizing contradictions reduces the system’s  “social basis of hegemony”;  
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c) Transnational capitalism is awakening the forces for the second phase of the “double movement” in 
an effort to re-embed the economy while the attempts at regulating the market partakes a potential 
impact on the interests of the core powers of the existing international system as well as on 
individual societies and people. This contradictory outcome is due to the nature of an established 
market system where society is already shaped and patterned in such a manner in order to make it 
function according to its own laws (Polanyi, 1957: 57). 
 
Propositions 
The main analytical framework, on which the paper is based, proposes an analysis of present-day 
contradictions in the world structure as related to the questions of legitimacy, hegemony and the 
embeddedness of the economy:  
I. Globalization and transnational capitalism is challenging the foundations of hegemony of nation-
state capitalism. Meanwhile, it is problematic to discern at the global level a similar scale of 
integration of state (political society with the key concerns on domestic politics) and civil society 
(“common sense” in connection with culture and religion). In other words, transnational 
capitalism does not really constitute in organic substance a “global state” vis-à-vis a necessary 
counterpart in the form of a “global civil society” which could represent the social basis of 
hegemony (Germain and Kenny, 1998: 15-16).   
II. Economic globalization through increased functional integration of markets is promoting a 
tangible historical bloc of global capital/elite classes but less-organically founded global civil 
societies; this makes it difficult to envisage a genuine Polanyian “double movement”, i.e. civil 
societies responding to the alienation and repression of the market. Both states (a tool promoting 
economic globalization) and transnational civil societies in their diversified forms are being 
currently pulled apart in various directions. On the one hand, states are becoming committed to 
the transnationalization of economic activities (production, finance and service), while on the 
other hand, they are organically tied to national structures through a wide range of functions and 
provisions, not least welfare.  
III. Many “resistance movements” found in the self-proclaimed transnational civil societies are not 
more than conjunctural responses to immediate effect of maldevelopments (poverty, 
environment, terrorism, etc,) or to general principles of common concern (democracy and human 
rights, etc) without any organic foundation in having concrete influence in both state politics and 
market mechanism.  
IV. Transnational capitalism in the short run serves the interest of capital but not of the capitalist 
system in the long run, the reason for being that capital is given excessive power in creating a 
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one-directional relationship in which hegemony is ever more defined by transnational capital 
class on its own terms and then imposed on the rest of the system. As a consequence, capitalism 
is bound to loose its resilient capacities and unleash tendencies leading to self-destructive 
dislocation and disintegration. This notwithstanding, any successful “double movement” against 
the ravages of neoliberalism remains embryonic due to the contradictory relationship between 
market economy and market society in which the market pattern and logic remains at the heart of 
the social organization; this means the returning to our original question regarding the realizable 
possibility of passive revolution at the age of global capitalism. 
 
The crisis of hegemony of transnational capitalism 
The debate is till going on as to how to conceptualize the hegemony of transnational capitalism. One way to 
conceptualize the new form of hegemony is to see it as transnational liberalism (Agnew and Corbridge, 
1995). The ideological base of the hegemony is the market (marketization and market-access) and the power 
base of the hegemony has transformed from hegemonic order/stability (balance of power under nation-state 
and inter-state structure) to hegemonic liberalism and market fundamentalism (imbalance of power under 
transnational structure) (Agnew and Corbridge, 1995). The hegemonic objective is to structure a global 
economic system with a dominant mode of production that is meant to be solely legitimate and universal, 
The best way to realize this objective is to set up new types of transnational institutions with laws and rules 
that not only preserve the traditional hierarchy but also generate interests for the expansion of transnational 
capital in new ways while setting up constrains for others.  
For example, nowadays, the conceptualization of contemporary American hegemony under 
transnational capitalism is quite different from that which existed during the Cold War conflict that was 
defined primarily in terms of conventional Realism. Among critical theorists of international political 
economy, there has been disagreement regarding the extent of US dominance of the world system. While 
some adhere to a position of a weakening of American hegemony, others from a proto-Gramscian 
perspective and in response to the notion of “American decline” call for a dialectical understanding of 
American power (Cox, M. 2001: 324-327). According to this line of thinking, American hegemony in the 
era of globalization lies not only in its structural shaping power to impose order among nation-states, but 
also in its imposition of practices in the global economic system that are meant to be universal and superior 
to other types of economic models, such as that of the so-called East Asian “crony capitalism” or the 
European welfare state. Moreover, this hegemony is based less on the state but relies more on “a complex of 
international social relationships which connect the social classes of the different countries” (Cox, R. 
1993:62) as seen most explicitly in the formation of a transnational capitalist class (Sklair, 1998, 2000)2.  
This type of hegemony of intertwining capital and state poses both advantages and disadvantages to 
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the transnational capital class that on the one hand, “The TNS does not yet (and may never!) constitute a 
centralised global state and formal political authority remains to a considerable extent fragmented, and 
fragmented unevenly, among weaker and stronger national states.” But on the other hand, “This peculiar 
institutional structure, an historic contradiction of the global capitalist system, presents transnational elites 
with the possibility, and the need, to influence a multitude of national states” (Robinson, 2005:9). 
As emphasized before, the Gramscian concept of social formation is less an economic mode of 
production but more a complex interaction of economic, political, cultural and ideological practices. 
Accordingly, people (classes and groups) who share the fundamental interests within the interaction are 
referred to as “historical bloc” or “social forces”. The inter-relationship between state, market and society is 
mutually determining and organically interdependent. Here, “organic” refers to the elements of linkages 
between the three, and when the “organic” interdependent linkage is decomposed or weakened, the moment 
of  “hegemony crisis” begin to take place.  
Cox has succinct descriptions of Gramsci’s notion of a “crisis of hegemony”: 
What he identified by these terms was a disarticulation between social groups and their 
putative political leaders, in sum a crisis in representation. In such as situation, old and new 
social forces coexisted, but the old ones had become detached from the political organizations 
that had formerly represented them, and the new ones had no produced organizations or 
“organic” intellectuals who could lead them effectively and bring them into coalescence with 
existing social forces to form a new hegemonic bloc. Two outcomes are possible in an organic 
crisis: either the constitution of a new hegemony or caesarism, .i.e., the freezing of unresolved 
contradictions (Cox, 1986, p.273). 
 
The crisis of transnational capitalism can be analyzed from two important perspectives according to 
Robinson (2005:12): A) a structural crisis of over-accumulations and social polarization (crisis of social 
reproduction, inequalities, and economic crises, the limit of expansion); B) a crisis of legitimacy and 
authority (the lack of consensual integration and mechanism of legitimation). In order to substantially verify 
these analytical propositions it is necessary to look at the new developments against the backdrop of the 
societal and geopolitical adjustments caused by the globalization process, which is bringing about 
transformative modifications to existing social, economic and political structures both nationally and 
internationally. 
 
The “de-constructions” of transnational capitalism 
Transformation under transnational capitalism denotes a conceptual difference between internationalization
and transnationalization (globalization). The former refers to “the extension of trade and financial flows 
across national borders”, whereas the latter implies that “the globalization of production has entailed the 
fragmentation and decentralization of complex production chains and the world-wide dispersal and 
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functional integration of the different segments in these chains” (Robinson and Harris, 2000:18-19). 
Transnational capital adopts a supraterritorial mode of organization: transnational mergers and acquisitions, 
global strategic alliances, and transworld business associations, thus increasing the level of concentration 
while at the same deterritorializing capital (Scholte, 1997:429). These transformations in the capitalist world 
system seriously affects the system’s constitutive rules and regulative capacities which are in the process of 
and transforming and restructuring. This process can be analyzed by looking at a number of changing 
relationships: 
 
Organic relations decomposed: labour and civil society 
The situation and status of the working class has, since the industrial revolution, been related to the position 
of the individual country on the international scene. From its genesis, capitalism developed unevenly in 
different parts of the world creating a system of dominating and dominated nations. When conditions of 
capital mobility are geographically limited within the nation-state boundary, it is possible for organized 
labour to compel capital into allowing it a certain participation in societal rearrangement, and not 
necessarily remain in a state of passive submission. In Gramscian terms, this path of passive revolution “is 
‘negotiated’ by unequal forces in a complex process through which the subordination and the resistance of 
the workers are created and recreated” (Simon, 1982: 64).  
In the context of war of position, the exploitation of working classes in developed countries 
historically went hand-in-hand with the economic surplus pumped out of the peripheral nations, which led to 
the improvement of workers’ well-being in rich nations. Internationally, this contributed to weakening 
global working class solidarity in such a way that “labour organizations in all of the advanced capitalist 
countries have not only supported their own multinationals in the brutal exploitation of the economies and 
workers of the poor nations, they have even supported wars in which the workers of one rich nation fought 
against those of another” (Yates, 2000:49). This has been empirically demonstrated in the case of the 
American hegemonic position. Modern history of the labour movement in the United States reveals that 
trade unions have been not only exclusionary in form but also pragmatic and selective in action. The 
objective of American organized labour solidarity was aimed not at conducting class struggle but at sharing 
benefits with business by supporting US corporations abroad and strengthening the country’s foreign policy 
regardless of the social costs on workers in other countries (Fletcher, 2003). As a consequence, this 
imperialist patriotism contributed to the distortion of US trade unions’ perception of globalization’s impact 
on the deterioration of their own job opportunities, welfare and social contract as well as on their 
understanding of the post-9/11 anti-terrorism policies. 
In the present phase of transnational capitalism, the transnationalization of production and finance 
permits the use, or threatened use, of capital mobility and relocation of parts or phases of production to 
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countries and regions where low wages and politically-repressed working conditions provide a greater 
degree of surplus extraction and exploitation. Domestically, the mobility power of financial and productive 
capital as a historical bloc has thus decomposed the traditional organic interdependent relationships between 
the market, productive forces and production relations, thus weakening the bargaining power of trade unions 
both in developed and developing countries.  
 It is common that each nation-state’s working class has its own historical heritage, its unique class 
formation, tradition and practices. However, as a result of the changing structure of traditional nation-based 
industrial production to one that is being restructured on a transnational scale, the global fragmentation and 
supraterritorial mode of accumulation means that class formation also appears to be less rigidly tied to 
territory and jurisdiction of nation-states in contrast to the traditional societal structure largely based on the 
dynamic interaction between national capital, workers and the state. According to one opinion, globalization 
is reorganizing relations to production by which “the proletariat worldwide is also in the process of 
transnational class formation” (Robinson and Harris, 2000:18-19).  
Nevertheless, despite the increasing common awareness over the negative impact on jobs and working 
conditions in the industrialized nations, it is still questionable whether a bourgeoning transnational working 
class is able to transcend the limit of a “class-in-itself” to become an organic “class-for-itself”3 because it 
has not realized the fact that  
The corporations operate only in their own interests. Sometimes these interests will coincide with 
those of a disadvantaged group, but only by disadvantaging another. For centuries, we have 
permitted ourselves to ignore the extent to which our welfare is dependent on the denial of other 
people's. We begin to understand the implications of the system we have created only when it 
turns against ourselves. (Monbiot, 2003)  
 
An organic global working class-for-itself can be realized when working classes, especially in 
developed countries, are able to grasp the initiative in the war of position, whereby workers together create a 
counter-hegemonic alliance in the hope of challenging the continued dominance of capital. Under the 
present conditions, the formation of an organic transnational working class resistance to transnational 
capitalism under a collective and shared identity of interests has still a long way to go. 
 
Organic relations strengthened: global capital 
Historically, the capitalist world order developed from the Pax Britannica historical bloc marked by realistic 
common understanding of balance of power, harmony of interest and political multipolarity to the Pax 
Americana historical bloc marked by US unipolar leadership, formal international institutions, security 
alliance under a general framework of a Fordist-Keynesian social structure of accumulation with “moderate 
organized labour and big capital” (Gill, 2003:58). Now the shift is moving towards a transnational historical 
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bloc “an American-centred and –led transnational historic bloc, where organized labour has been virtually 
marginalized” (Gill, 2003:59). 
The condition of globalization is imposing changes that affect the political constellations between the 
ruled and the ruling elites. This can be seen in the evolution of historical blocs which are in close connection 
with social movements to deal with specific historical conjunctures or solve concrete problems that have to 
be confronted by different social groups. According to Gill and Cox, 
An historical bloc refers to an historical congruence between material forces, institutions and 
ideologies, or broadly, an alliance of different forces politically organized around a set of 
hegemonic ideas that gave strategic direction and coherence to its constituent elements. 
Moreover, for a new historic bloc to emerge, its leaders must engage in ‘conscious planned 
struggle (Gill, 2003, p.58). 
 
In the struggle for hegemony, historical blocs form, dissolve and reform. For instance, in the current context 
of increasing awareness of the consequences of industrial capitalism on nature, big businesses attempted to 
mobilize a historical bloc around the theme of sustainable development against what it saw as a threatening 
counter-culture and movement organized around the powerful idea of the capitalist specificity of ecological 
crisis. 
In the context of capitalism, competitive capitalist interests may, at least for a time, coalesce into a 
relatively unified hegemonic bloc. Seen from today’s transnational capitalism, the situation is perhaps more 
true than in Kausky’s time. The breaking-down of physical barriers promoting the convergence of 
international capitals means that transnational companies are not only global in what they produce and sell 
in many parts of the world, but become conglomerates united under similar interests. Former national 
companies have been merging with those of other countries maintaining a relation of hierarchical 
dependency to the larger ones. Thus, in the view of some scholars, the transnational capitalist class (TCC) is 
no longer “Western” but is “global” (Sklair, 2000).  
According to this interpretation, the TCC is becoming the ruling class that controls global decision-
making and shapes the development agenda; in other words, a transnational capitalist historical bloc has 
been created. Such a coalition encompasses the North-South dichotomy and consists of various economic 
and political actors including national elites (parties, media, technocracies and policy-makers), transnational 
corporations, global financial institutions, and international organizations (Robinson and Harris, 2000). In 
the new era of corporative capitalism, local and national markets are linked together into forming a global 
market while national capitals have fused into transnational capital. This bloc is striving to withdraw most 
of the concessions previously made as a response to labour pressures as well as to socialist and other anti-
systemic movements. Its hegemony is said to be so decisive that whether or not its position and ideology is 
agreed upon by the society as a whole becomes less important. However, what deserves particular attention 
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with the rise of neoliberal globalization is the emergence of financial capital as an engine of capitalist 
accumulation. 
With an estimated worth of $360 trillion (larger than the value of the entire global economy), world 
financial capitalism is ushering an age of complexities and instabilities (Gilpin, 2001:6-7). The basic 
principles of finance, and related branches such as insurance, property market, stock market and public 
finance are not only increasingly integrating national economies into the capitalist world economy but also 
fundamentally changing the way economic activities are organized and operated. Contrary to conventional 
economic theory, financial capital, unlike productive capital, does not lead to relatively stable price 
formation based on a rational assessment over a number of criteria, such as management, products, 
marketing, or record of profitability. Rather, financial capital is highly speculative by nature and is 
inherently inclined to avoid the logic of equilibrium in favour of the momentum of self-fulfilling 
expectations as when a rising stock price attracts buyers who through these purchases further raise the price 
level to the point of creating a bubble. The East Asian crisis, the Mexican crisis and the Russian crisis were 
all indications of the grave consequences created by financial speculations that appear to be beyond 
anyone’s capacity to control. 
 
Organic relations weakened: state  
Historically, it is not uncommon to establish an evolutionary connection between the mergence of 
capitalism and the rise of the nation-state because this connection is theorized from the prism of 
“modernity” and “rationalization especially from the European context (Wood, 1999). In the past long 
history of nation-state capitalism and inter-state capitalist world system, the hegemony of capital lies in a 
recurrent process of passive revolution in which the state neutralizes emerging contradictions by 
implementing mechanisms of redistribution, reorganization and arbitration. The state plays a key role in 
mediating relations between productive forces and production relations. Under crisis circumstances political 
and economic elites as well as organic intellectuals begin to initiate state interventions to deal with the 
situation on two fronts: 1) taking-over of the management and enforcement of negotiations in the controlling 
of society on behalf of the ruling group; 2) intervention in the economy in order to regenerate productive 
forces and relations of productions. 
What is witnessed today is a situation in which transnational corporations, financial institutions and 
powerful individual investors have the capacity to move production to countries or regions where state’s 
policies may be more compliant to their interests. They are thus in a position to influence states’ foreign 
politics and development policies. In this general context, the social concerns of nation-states are being 
hollowed out by the promotion of neoliberal policies leading to a “race to the bottom”. In order to 
accommodate the transborder processes of accumulation, states have become more and more instrumental to 
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global economic forces penetrating local borders and markets. They behave as organs of capital, destined to 
create favourable conditions for its maximal expansion. In Europe, the transition from the welfare state to 
the competition state has become a reality.  
In contrast to this interpretation, some scholars argue that states and globalization are “mutually 
reflexive and are embedded in, or are co-constitutive of, each other”, which implies that globalization 
generates both constraints and opportunities for states (Hobson and Ramesh, 2002: 8). This notwithstanding, 
there is a general consensus today that globalization has largely weakened the state as well as national and 
global civil societies in which the power and dominance of capital resides. The French diplomat and 
political scientist, Jean-Marie Guehenno, argues that the idea of the nation-state as a political form spread 
from Europe over the rest of the world, but with the on-going weakening of the Western nation-states it is 
evident that capital, on the basis of new forms of technological modernization does not need the nation-state 
anymore (Guehenno in Grunenberg, 1998: 414). Nor does capital feel pressured by labour or anti-systemic 
forces. Other scholars, on the contrary, take an opposite position in claiming that the nation-state remains 
the primordial actor in both domestic and international economic affairs (Gilpin, 2001). In-between scholars 
recognize the interplays of continuity and change regarding the relationship between globalization and the 
state with a keen awareness of the notable changes in the character of the state in terms of capacities, 
constituencies, policy-making processes and contents, etc (Scholte, 1997). As Gindin puts it: 
Neoliberal globalization also tends to undermine, or at least weaken the capacities of states to 
legitimate capitalism itself; the earlier promises of steady material security and growing equality have 
given way to the demands of competitive insecurity: that of growing control over our lives has been 
trumped by the requirements of expanded accumulation; free trade agreements expose the centrality of 
constitutionalizing and guaranteeing property rights over other rights (Gindin, 2003:121) 
 
Economic globalization, especially financial and capital market liberalization, has systematically 
increased the process of the transnationalization of state autonomy in favour of global capital over national 
welfare social policies. Consequently, neoliberal globalization not only intensifies the global process of the 
“disembedded economy” - disembedding the market from society (Polanyi, 1944), but also further 
integrates and assimilates non-capitalist elements as well as non-market societies in its realm. 
The general agreement is however that the nation-state does not have a free hand in decision-making 
but rather is dependent on decisions made by transnational actors. States are no longer the indispensable 
organizing principle of capitalism and the legitimate mediator between contending forces. The breakdown 
of social order and the collapse of state authority in many regions 
The notion of social contract as citizen-state interactions has undergone dramatic transformations 
whereby the consent and consensus involving obligations of both citizens and government and 
accountability-control mechanisms are increasingly being marketized. Consequently, the “social” part of the 
contract is becoming less universal but more selective, while political participation is becoming less 
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inclusive but more exclusive. This implies the fundamental transformation of the essence of the social 
contract that - in its original meaning - emphasizes social and political rights. The concept of citizenship as a 
means of political rights and participation is changed into one of economic empowerment defined in terms 
of consumers and customers. Under the economy-dominated social contract, the market is ideologically 
perceived not only as a neutral place (institution) for the exchange of goods, resources and services, but also 
as the most efficient mechanism to regulate society and human relations.  
In the context of developing countries, the global market contributes to transforming civil society into 
becoming a kind of “social cushion” as well as objective ally to neoliberalism, i.e. grass-root organizations 
across the world with an anti-statist ideology step in among conflictual social forces and function as 
mediators between local organizations, the free-market state, foreign donors and transnational companies 
(Petras, 1997:10). 
 
The consequence of social order break-down: clashes of civilization/terrorism 
Globalization is usually conceptualized in economic terms. However, it is equally a political process that 
has societal and cultural consequences. To the extent that the object of passive revolution is to maintain the 
hegemony of capital, the question that arises is: where are the counter-hegemonic forces that need to be 
defused through passive revolution? Is capital more threatened by the non-existence of contending political 
forces than by their existence? Who and where are the opponents in a world of capital dominance? 
Most of the world has been unprepared for the new cleavages that have emerged in the contemporary 
world and which fall out of the traditional analysis. A surprising development after the West’s victory over 
state socialism, interpreted triumphally as the “end of history”, has been the resurgence of religious and 
ethnic ideologies under violent forms and diverse expressions. This is considered to be the new challenge to 
the international order. Based on their own historical evolution, many in the West tend to assume that 
development following social, cultural, and economic modernization would ultimately lead to the 
marginalization of religion. In contra-point to this view Huntington has argued that the hegemonic 
dominance of democratic liberalism encompassed in the notion of “the end of history” would pave the way 
for religious and cultural counter-hegemonic forces. In this perspective, global boundaries will no longer be 
defined by states but by cultural identities and the confrontation between cultural and religious ideologies 
will replace the conflict between political systems (Huntington, 1993). 
The 9/11 attack on the United States appeared to confirm the prophecy of the “clash of civilizations” 
by positing that the collision between West and Islam is the source of terrorism. However, the alleged 
conflict should not be one-sidedly conceptualized and theorized in terms of cultural essentialism. Rather, 
political Islamism can be analyzed as a counter-hegemonic project representing an outlet for action and a 
force for change. Conflicts between the West and Islam can be understood as a struggle between two rising 
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historical blocs: market dogmatism and Islamic revivalism (Li, 2002). Modernization and market 
fundamentalism cause severe disruptions in traditional ties of identity, authority and community b. This 
intrusion and the way it has been pushed forward can be identified as the source of religious resurgence as 
well as the rise of Islamic fundamentalism.  
Contrary to the dominant discourse of modernization that tends to place the blame on traditional 
ideologies and societies for the “backwardness” of Muslim countries, there is a need to put the 
problematique in the context of international political economy (Hersh, 2000). Religion was in fact used 
during the Cold War era as a bulwark by the United States in the Islamic world against the nationalist forces 
of secularism and socialist modernization. As Ahmad put it: “The defeat and/or decline of the democratic, 
secular, anti-colonial nationalism has given rise, in a host of countries, from India to Egypt to Algeria, to 
hysterical, irrational forms of cultural nationalism and atavistic hysteria” (Ahmad, 2004: 57). 
Since the objective of passive revolution is to consolidate the position of capital through adjustments 
in state-market-civil society relations, can it play a similar role in mediating the more fundamental clashes 
of deep-seated values and norms between market essentialism and religious fundamentalism? Where are the 
civil societies or other mechanisms, in this context, which can fulfill the role of mediating between global 
capitalist forces and cultural/religious anti-systemic movements (Islamic terrorism)? 
 
The crisis of counter-hegemony 
Historically, the expansion and legitimization of the capitalist system is materialized through not only the 
productive and technological driving forces but also the political and military imposition of capitalism on 
extra-European areas as during colonialism. The post-war capitalist world order has been primarily 
maintained under the US “hegemonic stability” (coercion based on geopolitical and material necessity) in 
combination with a Cold-War ideological “historical bloc” (consent on the basis of anti-communism 
commonality). The end of the contest between socialism and capitalism following the rise of US 
unilateralism and militarism symbolizes the strengthening of coercive realism and the weakening of 
consent-based hegemony. The emphasis on the role of international institutions  (the emphasis on the WTO 
and the rules of game) in the aftermath of the post-Cold War is part of the US strategy aiming at developing 
international rule-making institutions in order to make all states share the burdens (public goods) of 
regulating international relations without sacrificing its own political and military dominance. Transnational 
civil societies and social movements are an outcome of the wide-ranging social transformations, such as 
liberalization, marketization, privatization and democratization 
The analyses of the previous section propose that globalization and transnational capitalism is NOT 
expanding the European type of nation-state capitalist hegemonic project around the centrality of modernity 
and rationality, rather, it is a “class project without a national strategy” (Robinson, 2005:11). As Deak 
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argues that capitalism “is moving towards a non-hegemonic world structure. The emerging conflicting 
power centres, or more precisely, the counter-hegemonic movements, are a direct result of the non-
hegemonic moment” (Deak, 2005:50). Gill also maintains “any attempt to construct a hegemonic system of 
rule will tend to generate, dialectically, a set of counterhegemonic forces, which may or may not be 
progressive” (Gill, 2003:37). 
 One of the key questions this paper is addressing is whether hegemony and counter-hegemony 
embedded in the traditional system of national capitalism and inter-state order under American hegemonic 
stability is able to transcend to become “transnational hegemony” and “transnational counter-hgemony” 
under American dominance or class domination, not hegemony. In create terms, the questions are: 1) 
whether is resilient passive revolution capacity of capitalism able to transcend? 2) whether is the organic 
counter-hegemonic social forces able to transcend? These two aspects are two sides of the same coin. 
 
Wither transnational civil society? 
It is a less disputable fact that since the 1980s transnational civil societies grew both in number, size and 
scope as an outcome of the wide-ranging social transformations brought about by globalization, such as 
liberalization, marketization, privatization and democratization. However, it has been a continuous debate 
regarding the paradoxes of transnational civil societies as counterhegemonic social forces. A variety of 
social movements, under the banner of opposing the polarizing inequalities, declining social and 
environmental conditions, economic liberalization and unaccountable corporate power, etc, are coalescing 
into transnational networks in the process of shaping transnational civil societies. They protest against 
injustice, advocate radical democracy and promote global public sphere. They embraces participatory 
democracy but without a logocentric narrative or grand ideology such as liberalism and socialism (Esteva 
and Prakash, 1998). They believe in cosmopolitan or transnational citizenship and have a great faith in 
global governance. But the question is: whether are these cross-border interest groups, cultural groups and 
social networks able to create transnational organic social forces that are capable of reshaping the political 
structure of the global order and bringing about democratic and redistributive justice for the world system?  
 On concrete example of the conceptual problems regarding transnational civil society is the issue of 
“transnational citizenship”. A lexical interpretation of transnational citizenship refers to the extension of 
rights and political and social justice beyond nation-state boundaries. However, it makes big differences 
whether the criteria of “citizenship” is based on rights (citizenship rights in a nation-state framework), or 
whether it is based on community/society (membership rights within and across borders) since the former is 
enforceable and the latter is not (Fox, 2005:175) It is often used in connection with transnational social 
movements as “globalization from the below” in the sense that transnational pressure is mobilized to 
discipline domestic politics. Nevertheless, it is fundamentally different between citizenship rights defined 
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within an institutional framework and those are defined by collective action and shared identity (Fox, 
2005:174). The challenge of applying such a concept is whether the objectives and expectations which the 
notion implies can be realized.  
 There are fundamental differences between the notions and functions of transnational civil society 
conceptualized at two levels - from the above (the capital class) and from the below (the working class and 
subordinate groups). For the former, transnational civil society can be utilized to politically reduce statism 
and authoritarianism so as to protect its economic position and class interest; whereas for the latter, 
transnational civil society seeks to break the monopoly of the economic classes. The contradiction is 
“transnational civil society from the below” still needs the individual states to make necessary social, 
political and economic policies so as to protect and improve its socio-economic well-being. 
 
Wither “passive revolution”? 
The notion of passive revolution implies a transformation process - “revolution without revolution” 
(Adamson, 1980: 186) - i.e. crisis in hegemonic consensus and changes production relations are contained 
within existing social and institutional structure but without fundamentally challenging the established 
political order. The role passive revolution includes the use of trasformismo strategies to rein in popular 
support for the elite-engineered “revolution” - an elite project of change (Showstack Sassoon, 1987: 210). 
The analyses from different perspectives on the impact of transnational capitalism from the previous 
section reveal areas of potential problems and conflicts in applying the concept of passive revolution. It can 
be argued that passive revolution has lost a great deal of significance after decades of transformations; and 
the instrumentality of this notion in the context of nation-state capitalism cannot be automatically applied to 
the understanding of reformism and resilience of transnational capitalism at a time when these mechanisms 
are urgently needed to deal with a number of vital backlashes created by globalization4. Transnational 
capitalism today does not possess the same kind of hegemonic resilience in which state, market and civil 
society respond to each other’s legitimacy. Furthermore, the analytical categories within global capitalism’s 
political order have not yet been fully developed, which makes it difficult to act either on the basis of state’s 
coercive power or on civil society’s consensual power. 
In the past, capitalism survived from recurrent crises, assisted by both the trench system of civil 
society and the coercive apparatus of the state helping to provide a particular social with “a necessary 
combination of consent and coercion” (Cox, 1983:127). The regime change that is currently taking place in 
many parts of the world with the transition from “embedded liberalism” under a hegemonic structure to the 
disembeddedment of the economy under non-hegemony is threatening the former societal arrangement. The 
current world is seen as in a state of “non-hegemony” with resistance more related to the system’s legitimate 
crisis than to the contradictions of the system’s mode of production: 
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If hegemony is based on consent and effective inclusion of subaltern groups, then counter-
hegemony would emerge from the contradictions of a non-hegemonic period. When consent or 
legitimacy of an ethical hegemony is lost, then subaltern groups become discontented. The 
conditions would be ripe for a legitimate and popular challenge the social order that had 
marginalized them. (Deak, 2005:50) 
  
In essence, this evolution means entering uncharted territory with the world having to cope with 
transnational and financial globalization as dictated by the hegemony and strategies of neoliberalism. In this 
context however, the question that arises is whether and how capitalism is able to transgress the historical 
limits of its modus operandi that permits and reinforces capital accumulation without generating counter-
hegemonic blocs and anti-systemic movements?  
In political terms, the second phase of the “double movement” brought about through the 
implementation of Keynesian macroeconomics and the welfare state, could be understood as a “passive 
revolution” of the bourgeoisie, i.e. reforms in socio-economic conditions. In contrast, the present offensive 
of market neoliberalism can be conceptualised as the “active counter-revolution” of transnational corporate 
capitalism. While social-democratic reformism aim ostensibly at the formation of a permanent alliance 
between labour, capital and the state, market neoliberalism aims at the deconstruction of this structure and 
the utilization of the state in returning labour to a subaltern political position. While the agency of the state 
had partially protected society from the market forces at the global level, the post-welfare state, in contrast, 
has become the transmission belt of globalization. That is articulated in the adjustment of domestic societies 
to the requirements of global capitalism and the redistribution of the economic surplus in favor of the 
transnational capitalist classes worldwide. 
The stability and resilience of social power in modern capitalism has rested not just on the 
coercive apparatus of the state as traditionally understood, but also on eliciting consent through 
hegemony in consciousness and non-coercive sphere of “civil society” into forming the “extended 
state”. However, we are currently at a historical moment in which the “disembedded economy” at both 
the national and international levels is substantially raising the coercive potentiality of capital. The 
uncontested power of capital is at the same time reducing the consensual capacity of the elite class and 
is creating the fertile soil for a “double movement” in the form of worldwide anti-capitalism and anti-
globalization movements joining forces in de-legitimizing the on-going coercion of market capitalism. 
As expressed by Mittelman, there might be a similarity with the period around the Great Depression: 
Perhaps similar to the global economy of the 1930s, contemporary globalization appears to be 
approaching a conjuncture in which renewed liberal-economic structures will generate large-
scale political, social, and economic disruptions, as well as sustainable pressure for self-
protection (2000: 8) 
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Wither “double movement”? 
While the Gramscian political analytical framework guides us to look into the dynamics of social relations 
and the dialectical roles of different social forces on which capitalism’s resilience, sustainability and 
hegemony is built, Polanyi (1957) draws our attention to the market-society relations encapsulated in the 
“double movement”: on the one hand, the market (fictitious commodities) continuously extends its sphere 
by marketizing noneconomic aspects of human life in the way that human relations are constantly converted 
into impersonal ones or into acquiring a thing-like character, whose result is the disintegration of social 
bond which is an essential constituent of humanity; but on the other hand, as humans are not guided solely 
by economic motivations, they consciously or unconsciously resist marketization by reclaiming their 
humanity, i.e. sociality, dignity, freedom and sense of security, as well as by reactivating the essential role 
of the state as the institution that can be used to discipline the market. Thus double movements are 
embedded in the state-civil society relations as well.  
The contemporary debate over the interpretation of the notion of “double movement” in re-embedding 
the economy lies in whether this concept should denote “societal protectionism” and “political intervention” 
to control or regulate the market’s mode of functioning, or whether it should imply that re-embedding in a 
given market society can only be achieved through “a complete subjugation of the market” rather than any 
attempt to control it (Lacher, 1999a: 315). The complexity of the “double movement” in market society as a 
given structure is spelt out by Polanyi himself: 
Our thesis is that the idea of a self-adjusting market implied a stark utopia. Such an institution could 
not exist for any length of time without annihilating the human and natural substance of society; it 
would have physically destroyed man and transformed his surroundings into a wilderness. Inevitably, 
society took measures to protect itself, but whatever measures it took impaired the self-regulation of 
the market, disorganized industrial life, and thus endangered society in yet another way. (1957: 3, 
italic added) 
 
The dialectic dilemma as Polanyi explains is that when “society” is pegged to the “market”, it becomes 
complicated in the sense that the divisions in society between those who do and do not benefit from the 
market and “the economy”, including the institutions of market society, are always shaped by political 
struggles 
Based on the above understanding of capitalism, the common simplification of Polanyi’s market 
critique within IPE is challenged on the basis of the historical evolution of the industrial revolution, 
meaning that capitalism’s unique character as a form of economic organization has institutionalized the 
embeddedment of economic rationality and principles in social relations. This implies that counter-
movement is not without problematic consequences and the social democratic model was only a partial 
decommodification of the economy because of its non-eradication of labour as a commodity. In a 
contribution aiming to dispel the confusion surrounding the question of the transition from the welfare state 
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to the neoliberal competition state, Lacher puts it in the follow manner, “Precisely because the postwar 
economy had not been re-embedded, it was possible for the welfare state to succumb so rapidly to the 
revival of laissez-faire ideology” (Lacher 1999b: 350) 
 
Conclusion 
The contemporary coercive expansion of capitalism and the post-Cold War withdrawal of the United States 
as the only stabilizer of global hegemony together with its unpopular foreign policies after the 9/11 crisis 
have brought about the crisis of hegemony of the capitalist system as well as the marginalization of 
consent/consensus-generating elements, i.e. the institutions, practices, and social relations that constantly 
exist as alternatives or balances of power. Consequently, without consent-building capacity, transnational 
capitalism entails a self-denial potential towards dissolution and disintegration, unless a powerful 
transnational social force is successful in generating a transnational “double movement” to push capitalism 
to negotiate a substantial process of passive revolution. At the present time, it is still difficult to foresee the 
possibilities of an effective global counter-hegemonic project able to generate the possibilities of embedding 
global capitals and markets in shared social values and responsibilities. The key issue (conundrum) that 
needs to be understood is the nature of the totalizing force of capitalism vis-à-vis counter-movement in a 
nexus of hegemony and contradictions. 
The difficulties of forming a counter-hegemonic historical bloc compelling capitalism to engage 
a genuine process of “passive revolution”, as analyzed earlier, partake the complexity of the “double 
movement” in regulating the market. Both Gramsci and Polanyi, independently, converged on a 
similar critique and transcendence of mechanical Marxism aiming to grasp the dialectics behind state-
market-society relations with the dynamism and complexity of society as a key to understand the 
durability of capitalism in a global order. As Burawoy pinpoints: 
We can stretch Gramsci and Polanyi to generate new insights into the idea of the transnational 
society. From a Polanyian perspective, we can think of the way transnational society is forged in 
response to commodification generally but in particular to the commodification of land, labor, 
and money. But we must be very careful not to romanticize this transnational society. It, too, is a 
very uneven political terrain, populated by hierarchies of power, sloping down from center to 
periphery, and having its own fissures and ravines. From a Gramscian perspective,we can think 
of transnational society in its relation to supranational state-like agencies, but that connection 
contains struggles against capitalism as often as it provides grounds for its 
transcendence.(Burawoy, 2003). 
 
 This well complements this paper’s proposed contradictions of transnational capitalism as a dialectical 
and dynamic unity embedded in the interaction of reciprocal and paradoxical relations, which, on the one 
hand, opens the door for progressive transformations, while on the other hand, sets the limit of counter-
hegemonic protectionism within market society. The paper has to come to the conclusion that a return to the 
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reformism of the double movement and passive revolution does not have favourable conditions for 
implementation under the current situation. 
 
Note 
                                                 
1 Trasformismo used by Gramsci refers to a strategy of elite politics aiming at accommodating opposing 
forces that may disrupt the status quo and threatening the hegemony of the elite. It concludes the creation of 
a flexible, centrist coalition of government to isolate the extremes of the left and the right and the 
incorporation of extended cultural, social, economic, and political networks. 
 
2 The transitional capitalist class encompasses four main interlocking groups: 1) TNC executives and their 
local affiliates, 2) globalizing bureaucrats, 3) globalizing political and professionals, and 4) consumerist 
elites. 
 
3  Class-in-itself refers to the general common characteristics of being a worker in relations to the 
conventional classification based on production relations. Class-for-itself refers to the category of self-
activity and self-representation, i.e. collective political identity and common struggle. The difference 
between them is political, i.e. while everyone works for a living, not everyone struggles against injustices 
embedded in work and fights for a common course. See Lewis A. Coser, Masters of Sociological Thought: 
Ideas in Historical and Social Context, 2nd Ed., Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc, 1977. 
 
4 John Gerard Ruggie (6 June 2002), in a lecture given by to the London School of Economics, described 
three key globalization backlashes: 1) Globalization distributes benefits highly unequally; 2) There is a 
growing imbalance in global rule making; 3) Globalization is generating greater vulnerability to unfamiliar 
and unpredictable forces leading to economic instability and social dislocation. See the lecture transcript 
Taking Embedded Liberalism Global: The Corporate Connection available at:  
http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/globalDimensions/globalisation/takingEmbeddedLiberalism/transcript.htm 
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